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Enemy	Films	on	Soviet	Screens:	trophy	films	during	the	early	Cold	
War,	1947-52	
Claire Knight, University of Oxford* 
Introduction	
The Soviet Union fought a cultural war on two fronts during the final years of Stalin’s 
leadership. The first front faced inward, against the legacy of the Great Patriotic War and 
how it was won: against the effects of wartime liberalization and fraternization with the West. 
The second front faced outward, against the infiltration of Western culture in the context of 
the emerging Cold War. Among the key weapons wielded by the Soviet regime were 
intensified censorship, administrative centralization, and a series of political campaigns—the 
Zhdanovshchina, anti-kowtowing [nizkopoklonstvo] to the West, and anti-cosmopolitanism—
intended to purge Soviet artistic and intellectual life of cultural heterodoxy or the “alien” 
influences of the West and Jews.1 The ammunition consisted of policies as diverse in their 
targets and caliber as the banning of specific films, authors and jazz music, outlawing 
marriage to a foreigner, prosecuting scientists in sudy chesti (honor courts) for sharing findings 
with Western colleagues, and subjecting Red Army former prisoners of war to filtratsiia 
(filtration) and internment in order to contain those tainted by contact with the West.2 It was 
                                                
* I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Royal 
Historical Society for making the research for this article possible. I am also indebted to the anonymous 
reviewers of this piece for their constructive feedback, particularly that of the scholar who engaged so closely 
with the conceptual framework. All translations are the author’s, except where noted otherwise. 
1 For a succinct overview of these metamorphosing campaigns, see: Frank Grüner, ‘“Russia’s Battle against the 
Foreign”: The Anti-Cosmopolitanism Paradigm in Russian and Soviet Ideology’, European Review of History, 17 
(2010), 445–72 (pp. 450–60). 
2 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI) f. 17, op. 116, d. 277, ll. 30-34 
(Postanovlenie Orgbiuro TsK VKP(b) o kinofil'me “Bol'shaia zhizn'”, 4 September 1946), reprinted in K.M. 
Anderson and L.V. Maksimenkov, Kremlevskii kinoteatr: 1928-1953: dokumenty (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), 763–
767. Martin Lücke, “The Postwar Campaign against Jazz in the USSR (1945-1953),” in Jazz behind the Iron 
Curtain, ed. Gertrud Pickhan and Rüdiger Ritter, Jazz under State Socialism (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2010), 83–
98; George Ginsburgs, The Citizenship Law of the USSR, vol. 25, Law in Eastern Europe (BRILL, 1983), 53; Mark 
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a battle of recovery and defense; a struggle to re-establish Soviet cultural orthodoxy and 
reveal the paucity of Western culture. 
 It is in this context of cultural defense that we find one of the most paradoxical 
phenomena of the Cold War period, namely the screening of Western films in the USSR. 
From early 1947 until Stalin’s death, films from the capitalist dream factories of Hollywood 
and Nazi Germany were screened at a rate nearly commensurable with that of new Soviet-
made productions, enlivening screens from Moscow to Altai, Moldova to Georgia, Latvia to 
Azerbaijan. The foreign films were known as trofeinye fil'my (captured “trophy” films) since 
they were drawn from among the 10,669 films captured by the Red Army primarily from the 
Reichsfilmarchiv in Berlin in 1945.3 They were tremendously popular with Soviet audiences, as 
attested by the wealth of colorful anecdotes peppering memoirs of the period,4 but it is the 
mere fact of their existence that has most bemused scholars of Soviet cinema. Studies have 
been quick to note the pragmatic function of trophy films: their release coincided with the 
dearth in domestic film production known as malokartin'e or film famine during which, in 
1951, the number of new Soviet-made releases dropped to an all-time low of nine. Trophies 
                                                                                                                                                  
Edele, Soviet Veterans of World War II: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941-1991 (Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 102–03. The most well-known honor court trial involved cancer researchers Nina Kliueva and 
Grigorii Roskin, see Nikolai Krementsov, The Cure: A Story of Cancer and Politics from the Annals of the Cold War 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).  
3 These unlicensed trophy films screened until 1956. For more on the origins and precise composition of the 
trophy film collection, see: Claire Knight, “Stalin’s Trophy Films, 1947-52: A Resource,” KinoKultura, no. 48 
(2015), http://www.kinokultura.com/2015/48-knight.shtml; Ministerstvo kul’tury SSSR, “Catalogue of Foreign 
Sound Films Released on the Soviet Screen, 1927-1954,” trans. Richard Taylor, Studies in Russian and Soviet 
Cinema 10, no. 2 (May 3, 2016): 123–98. 
4 Key memoirs for trophy film anecdotes include: Joseph Brodskii, “Trofeinoe (1986),” in Istoriia otechestvennogo 
kino: khrestomatiia, ed. A.S. Troshin (Moscow: Kanon+, 2012), 418–21; Vassily Aksyonov, In Search of Melancholy 
Baby, trans. Michael Henry Heim and Antonina Bouis (New York: Random House, 1987); Bulat Okudzhava, 
Devushka moei mechty: avtobiograficheskie povestvovaniya (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1988). For interviews 
mentioning trophy films, see Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature 
Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 205–209, 237; Mark Edele, ‘Strange Young Men in 
Stalin’s Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945-1953’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 50 (2002), 37–
61 (pp. 53–56); Timothy Johnston, Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life under Stalin, 1939-1953, Oxford 
Historical Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 191–198, 206; Frederick H. White, 
‘Tarzan in the Soviet Union’, The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 42 (2015), 64–85 (pp. 66–68). A few respondents in 
the Harvard Émigré Interview Project, conducted from 1951-53, also describe trophy films. See “Harvard 
Project on the Soviet Social System,” Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, accessed December 20, 2014, 
http://daviscenter.fas.harvard.edu/library/research-guides/archival-sources-soviet-history/hpsss.  
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were used to keep the cinema industry alive and the war weary masses entertained.5 More 
recently, supposition as to the appeal of the profitability of trophy screenings for the Politburo 
has been confirmed by Natacha Laurent, providing a more cynical rationale for the screening 
of what were essentially enemy films in early Cold War USSR.6  
 These pragmatic explanations are in need of further scrutiny and elaboration—an 
endeavor that this article undertakes. But they also require supplementation, for by their 
reckoning trophy films were at best a compromise in the face of financial deficit and domestic 
production problems. By eschewing a discussion of the ideology of trophy films, the 
pragmatic and economic emphases of existing scholarship convey only a partial account of 
official motivations for releasing these films and risk distorting the regime’s perspective on 
cinema and cultural production. After all, by the postwar period sharp distinctions were no 
longer being made between the entertainment, commercial, and “enlightenment” or political 
educational functions of films. Such a synthesis had been some time in the making, for while 
the early Bolshevik approach recognized the interdependence of these various aspects of the 
cinema industry as a whole, it failed to do so in relation to individual films. For instance, 
Lenin’s 1922 statement on the usefulness of entertainment films for generating revenue and 
attracting an audience for the accompanying “films of a particularly propagandist content”7 
that were intended to flesh out cinema programs (according to the so-called “Lenin 
proportion”8), assumes that individual films were either attractional or educational in 
function—not both. This contrast was maintained by proponents on either side of the 
                                                
5 Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917-1953 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 213–214; 
Maya Turovskaya, “The 1930s and 1940s: Cinema in Context,” in Stalinism and Soviet Cinema, ed. Richard 
Taylor and Derek Spring (New York: Routledge, 1993), 51; Richard Taylor, Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and 
Nazi Germany, 2nd ed. (I.B. Tauris, 1998), 48–49; White, “Tarzan in the Soviet Union,” 78. 
6 Natacha Laurent, L’œil Du Kremlin: Cinéma et Censure en URSS sous Staline, 1928-1953 (Toulouse: Privat, 2000), pp. 
234–239. See also Sergei Kapterev, “Illusionary Spoils: Soviet Attitudes toward American Cinema during the 
Early Cold War,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 10, no. 4 (2009): 790; Kristin Roth-Ey, 
Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011), 39–43. 
7 Lenin quoted in Ian Christie and Richard Taylor, eds., The Film Factory: Russian and Soviet Cinema in Documents 
1896-1939 (London: Routledge, 1994), 56. 
8 Ibid., 121. 
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“entertainment or enlightenment debate” that dominated Soviet discussions of cinema 
throughout the 1920s,9 until it was finally resolved under the leadership of Boris Shumiatskii, 
who was made chairman of the central cinema organization, Soiuzkino, in 1930. Shumiatskii 
advocated integrating the hitherto opposing aims of entertainment and political education 
into a unified ideal to be aspired to by each film production, though this was rarely achieved 
in practice.10  
It was in this context of the synthesis of entertainment and education in individual 
films that trophy films were conceived, processed and screened, and it is in this context that 
they must be analysed. Instead of considering postwar trophy films as a product of a revived 
1920s distinction between entertaining and enlightening cinema, this study examines the 
place of trophy films in a cinema tradition that had striven since the release of Chapaev 
(Vasil'ev “Brothers”, 1934) to create “clear ideological content wrapped in a cloak of 
entertainment”.11 This approach necessitates a conceptualization of trophy films as Soviet 
products—formed by Soviet editors for Soviet audiences according to the priorities and 
practices of the Soviet regime—and not simply foreign films.  
In this light, it becomes clear that the apparent aberration of trophy films were in fact 
congruent with the state’s postwar policies reconsolidating Soviet culture and waging the 
burgeoning “culture war”12 with the West. This is because trophy films were a quintessential 
example of the Cold War tactic of negative self-definition. Recent scholarship on comparative 
Cold War cultures has established that negative definitions of cultural identity were crucial 
                                                
9 Denise Youngblood, Movies for the Masses: Popular Cinema and Soviet Society in the 1920s (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 35–49. 
10 Richard Taylor, “Soviet Cinema as Popular Culture: Or the Extraordinary Adventures of Mr Nepman in the 
Land of the Silver Screen,” Revolutionary Russia 1, no. 1 (June 1, 1988): 45–46; Jamie Miller, Soviet Cinema: Politics 
and Persuasion Under Stalin, 1st edition (I. B. Tauris, 2010), 49. 
11 Taylor, “Soviet Cinema as Popular Culture,” 46. 
12 David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 1; Kathleen Starck, “Introduction,” in Between Fear and Freedom: Cultural Representations of the Cold War, 
ed. Kathleen Starck (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 3. 
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during the 45-year conflict,13 meaning that the competing political systems defined themselves 
in terms of not only what they were, but also what they were not. For instance, in Soviet films set 
partially in the West such as The Russian Question (Russkii vopros, Romm, 1948) and Sport Honor 
(Sportivnaia chest', Petrov, 1951), the corruption and deprivation evident under capitalism serve 
to highlight the equity and opportunity inherent in Soviet society. Through the careful 
reprocessing and presentation of trophy films, the Soviet regime sought to use the cinematic 
production of the West to condemn it, revealing the flaws of capitalist society through its own 
films and implicitly exonerating Soviet culture as its antithesis. In this way, screening enemy 
films not only made good economic sense, but also presented a prime opportunity to 
propagandize the Soviet way of life.  
What follows, then, is a reevaluation of trophy film, beginning with a thorough 
examination of the financial and practical interests driving their release, followed by an 
investigation into what was essentially the official Soviet response to the question of whether 
foreign cultural production could be conformed to the aims of a cinema industry focused on 
combining entertainment and Soviet ideology. This question will be considered not only from 
the regime’s perspective, however, but also from that of Soviet viewers whose impressions of 
trophy films—recorded in memoirs, interviews and archives—will be scrutinized in order to 
ascertain the extent to which popular perceptions of the repackaged foreign films aligned with 
official intentions in screening enemy films during the early Cold War.  
The	Timeliness	&	Profitability	of	Trophy	Films	
Trophy film releases were both timely and profitable, playing a key role in maintaining the 
Soviet cinema industry. However, such lofty potential initially went unrecognized by the 
regime. For although foreign films had provided a valuable source of revenue with which to 
                                                
13 Patrick Major and Rana Mitter, “East Is East and West Is West? Towards a Comparative Socio-Cultural 
History of the Cold War,” in Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History, ed. Patrick Major and Rana 
Mitter (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 7. 
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subsidize revolutionary cinema during the 1920s, film imports had been abandoned by the 
mid-1930s, leaving socialist realist fare alone to enlighten Soviet audiences. This policy of 
cinematic autarky was amended during the war, allowing for film exchanges with the Allies 
that totaled five to eight titles per year.14 It was this moderate approach to foreign film import 
that originally set the pattern for trophy film releases,15 as six trophies were edited, dubbed or 
subtitled, and screened in 1947, and initially another six planned for release in 1948.  
This measured approach soon changed dramatically, with 50 trophy films approved 
for processing on 31 August 1948. The timing of this decision was significant as it came ten 
weeks after the introduction of the policy of “fewer but better films” that drastically reduced 
the number of titles approved for development by Soviet studios in order to concentrate the 
industry’s investment on the creation of masterpieces.16 The policy was ratified as part of the 
14 June 1948 film production plan, which also included the only reference in such a plan 
during the late Stalin era to foreign films (i.e. the second set of six trophies mentioned above). 
It is possible that this juxtaposition indicates a sensitivity on the part of the Ministry of 
Cinema and Central Committee to the need to offset the impact of the “fewer but better” 
policy and bolster film release rates with foreign titles. The Minister of Cinema Ivan 
Bol'shakov was careful to select the types of films that he deemed would be pleasing to Soviet 
audiences,17 drawing films primarily from the most popular but least represented genres in 
                                                
14 Youngblood, Movies for the Masses, 64; Vladimir Kozlov, “Spisok Amerikanskikh fil’mov v sovetskom i 
rossiiskom prokate 1929-1998,” Kinograf, no. 16 (2005): 176. RGASPI f. 17, op.125 (Papers of the Department of 
Agitation and Propaganda), d. 576, l. 3 (letter from I. G. Bol'shakov to A. A. Zhdanov, 14 March 1947). 
15 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 576, l. 3.  
16 The “fewer but better” strategy of film production marked a deliberate policy change rather than simply the 
ratification of an existing trend. For although postwar shortages and other challenges, not to mention the 
increasingly labyrinthine censorship system, did retard film production during the late Stalin era, release rates 
had actually recovered in the initial postwar years, with 18 films in 1946, 24 in 1947, and 22 in 1948. It was not 
until after the introduction of the “fewer but better” policy in mid-1948 that domestic releases plummeted to the 
dismal figures characteristic of malokartin'e: 12 in 1949, 13 in 1950, 9 in 1951, and 10 in 1952 (excluding filmed 
concerts and theatrical performances). These figures are based on the release dates for domestic film productions 
compiled in Aleksandr Veniaminovich Macheret, ed., Sovetskie khudozhestvennye filʹmy: annotirovannyi katalog: vol. 2 
zvukovye filʹmy, 1930-1957 (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1961). 
17 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 576, l. 3.  
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postwar Soviet film—musicals and adventures—thereby filling a gap in domestic 
production.18 
 The wide-scale release of trophy films also filled the coffers, which was a decided boon 
at a time when the film industry was being subjected to close budgetary scrutiny with the 
intent of using profits to finance postwar reconstruction. As Laurent notes, it was in this 
context that a discourse of profitability emerged in Ministry of Cinema correspondence,19 
while concern for cost-effectiveness helped fuel intensified censorship. Trophy films, with 
their lack of licensing fees, minimal processing costs and most importantly, box office draw, 
presented an ideal scenario for the budget conscious Ministry of Cinema, as the majority of 
scholarly references to trophy film imply.20 It is clear from the 31 August 1948 resolution that 
the Central Committee was aware of the economic potential of screening foreign films, since 
it required Bol'shakov to guarantee personally that the films would garner a profit of no less 
than 750 million rubles.21 It seems to have been Bol'shakov himself who first stressed the 
financial benefits of the unlicensed pictures. On 5 August 1948, he proposed to Deputy 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers Georgii Malenkov the release of Captain of the Army 
‘Freedom’ (Kapitan armii ‘Svoboda’, 1948; Viva Villa! Conway, 1934), concentrating exclusively on 
the financial argument: he anticipated a revenue of 35-40 million rubles if circulated na 
zakrytyi ekran, through the “closed” network of workers’ clubs and houses of culture, or 50-60 
                                                
18 A mere eight Soviet-made adventure films premiered during 1945-52, of which only six were on wide release, 
while Aleksandrov’s Spring (Vesna, 1947) and Pyr'ev’s Cossacks of the Kuban (Kubanskie kazaki, 1950) were the only 
proper musicals—meaning that they were advertised specifically as musical comedies and featured songs with 
lyrics relevant to the plot. In contrast, 24 musicals and 17 adventures were released from among the trophy 
archive, constituting 47.1% of trophy releases. Knight, “Stalin’s Trophy Films.” 
19 Laurent, L’œil, 225. In 1946, the cinema industry turned a profit of three billion rubles, two billion of which 
were directed into reconstruction. Ibid., 226. 
20 Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 213; Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 206; Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, 43; Maiia 
Turovskaia, “Gollivud v Moskve, ili Sovetskoe i amerikanskoe kino 30-kh-40-kh godov,” Kinovedcheskie zapiski 97 
(2010): 59; Johnston, Being Soviet, 189; Mark Edele, Stalinist Society, 1928-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 155. 
21 RGASPI f. 17, op. 3, d. 1072, ll. 31-32 (Postanovlenie Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) o vypuske na ekran 
zagranichnykh kinofilʹmov iz trofeinogo fonda, 31 August 1948), reprinted in Andrei Artizov and Oleg Naumov, 
eds., Vlastʹ i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia: dokumenty TSK RKP(b)-VKP(b), VChK-OGPU-NKVD o kulʹturnoi politike: 
1917-1953 gg. (Moscow: Demokratiia, 1999), 639–40.; Laurent, L’œil, 236. 
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million if screened publicly, na shirokii ekran.22 It is possible that this attractive set of figures 
inspired Malenkov and the Central Committee to require, four days later, that Bol'shakov 
provide a lengthy list of potential releases from the trophy collection, from which were drawn 
the fifty titles approved on 31 August. Subsequently, the Minister of Cinema embraced larger 
scale plans for trophy film processing and returned to Malenkov six months later requesting a 
second lot of fifty releases in order to address a shortfall in the Ministry’s yearly profit plan.23 
Twenty-five films were eventually approved in the resolutions of 7 May and 9 June 1949. 
These documents also demanded profit guarantees from the Minister of Cinema, totaling 430 
million rubles, indicating that revenue expectations had inflated.24 In this way, while the 
financial incentive for trophy film processing was first voiced by a budget conscious Minister, 
the initiative to undertake large scale trophy distribution rested with the revenue-minded 
Central Committee. 
 The expectations of the Central Committee concerning the profitability of trophy 
films were well founded, as both anecdotal evidence and the archival record confirm. “The 
first of May Demonstration was nothing in comparison with the queue for tickets when an 
American film opened,”25 recalls memoirist Valentin Tikhonenko. It was doubtless such 
enthusiasm that inspired cinema managers to maximize the number of showings per day and 
extend as long as possible the overall runs of the foreign pictures. First secretary of the 
Komsomol Central Committee Nikolai Mikhailov noted this trend with consternation, 
complaining to the Department of Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) of the foreign films’ 
monopoly on screens across the Soviet Union. He made reference to the cinema Oktiabr in 
Barnual′ (Altai), which showed five foreign films for a total of 45 days, while Chiaureli’s Stalin 
                                                
22 Laurent, L’œil, 236. 
23 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132 (Agitprop), d. 249, l. 57 (I. G. Bol'shakov to V. M. Molotov, 18 March 1949).  
24 RGASPI f. 17, op. 3, d. 1075, ll. 82-83 (Postanovlenie Politbiuro TsK VKP(b) o vypuske na ekran 
zagranichnykh kinofilʹmov iz trofeinogo fonda, 7 May 1949), f. 17, op. 3, d. 1076, l. 41 (Postanovlenie Politbiuro 
TsK VKP(b) o vypuske na ekran zagranichnykh kinofil'mov iz trofeinogo fonda, 9 June 1949). Both documents 
are reprinted in Artizov and Naumov, Vlastʹ i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia, 651–52.  
25 Olesia Guk, “Tarzan v svoem otechestve: Valentin Tikhonenko,” Pchela 11 (November 1997), 
http://www.pchela.ru/podshiv/11.htm. Translation by: Johnston, Being Soviet, 198.  
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epic The Vow (Kliatva, 1946) entertained audiences for only two days, and the re-release of 
Romm’s classic Lenin in October (Lenin v Oktiabr, 1937), only one day. Meanwhile in Riga, he 
continued, screenings of the German musical Girl of my Dreams (Devushka moei mechty, 1947; Die 
frau meiner träume [The Woman of my Dreams], Jacoby, 1944)26 began at 11am and continued for 
over 15 hours.27 It was intensive showings like this that enabled the Marika Rökk musical to 
out-screen the domestic hit, Secret Agent (Podvig razvedchika, Barnet, 1947), by a factor of five (on 
a per copy basis), as film historian Maia Turovskaia calculated.28 In total, the film garnered 
15.7 million ticket sales in its first year. This was actually a relatively low figure compared 
with the other trophy films for which box office data are available, with average ticket sales of 
27.6 million each, out-selling the average domestic production by 4 million.29 The four Tarzan 
films released in 1952 were particularly successful, earning between 38.6 million and 42.9 
million ticket sales each, making them the top selling films of the late Stalin period.  
 Added to the profitability of trophy films, was also their cost-effectiveness. Not only 
were trophy production costs negligible—requiring simply the services of translators, editors, 
and in the case of the German films (which were dubbed and distributed on the public 
network of cinemas in contrast to the American films, which were subtitled and circulated on 
the closed network), voice actors—but the films also avoided much of the costly, time-
consuming process of censorship. This process, according to a report by Minister of State 
Control Lev Mekhlis in May 1948, involved alarming expenditures, adding its own form of 
financial wastage to cinematic production. For instance, he calculated that in 1947 the 
                                                
26 Where the Soviet release date of a trophy film is not indicated in the body of the text, it will be noted after the 
Russian title in the parenthetical comment that accompanies the first mention of a film, followed by the original 
title (with English translation for German titles), director and release date. 
27 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 576, ll. 57-58 (letter from N. A. Mikhailov to A. A. Kuznetsov and M. A. Suslov, 7 
October 1947). 
28 Turovskaya, “The 1930s and 1940s: Cinema in Context,” 51. There were, however, far more copies of the 
Soviet-made film, meaning that it took first place at the box office with 30% more ticket sales overall. 
29 These averages are based on available box office data, representing 12 out of 86 trophy films and 26 out of 89 
Soviet-made features during 1947-52. For trophy box office rates, see Sergei Kudriavtsev, “Poseshchaemostʹ 
otechestvennykh i zarubezhnykh filʹmov v sovetskom kinoprokate,” Kinanet.livejournal.com, accessed February 4, 
2014, http://kinanet.livejournal.com/689229.html. For Soviet feature box office rates, see Sergei Zemlianukhin 
and Miroslava Segida, eds., Domashniaia sinemateka: otechestvennoe kino 1918-1996 (Moscow: Dublʹ-D, 1996). 
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rejection of 13 screenplays and rewriting of two more represented losses of 720,000 rubles. 
Similarly, costs for reshooting and re-editing four Kiev studio productions that same year 
amounted to three million rubles, at a time when the average black and white feature cost 
four to five million rubles and color films, eight to ten.30  
Trophy films did of course require censoring, yet the task was more straightforward in 
many ways than with Soviet-made feature films. The ideological brigades established to 
search out potential releases had thousands of films from which to choose, meaning that they 
could be rigorous in excluding films without costing the Ministry of Cinema in terms of 
investments in script-writing or filming. Trophy film censorship also required fewer stages: 
edits were simply planned and executed, and the final product approved for release or 
excluded if deemed unsatisfactory.31 Unforeseen challenges in transforming the film to meet 
Soviet standards were resolved within the Gor'kii studio editing department, rather than 
involving the Artistic Council of the Ministry of Cinema (or khudsovet), the Ministry of Cinema 
itself, and/or Central Committee, as was the case for domestic productions.32 It was 
impossible to order reshoots, thereby closing off another expensive avenue often traversed by 
Soviet censors. Trophy films also avoided what were arguably the most sensitive topics for 
Soviet censorship: contemporary Soviet reality and positive heroes. Countless scripts and 
films were abandoned during the postwar years due to insufficiencies in representing these 
two features—a factor neatly sidestepped by trophy films. Finally, artistic standards were also 
slackened for trophy films. Disjointed editing, problems in continuity, poor dialogue, weak 
plot—all such shortcomings could be attributed to the original film studio and taken as 
evidence of the inferior quality of bourgeois cinema. In fact, during the war, US Ambassador 
Averell Harriman observed that Soviet film technicians dubbed and edited (licensed) 
                                                
30 Laurent, L’œil, 230, 171. 
31 RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 250, ll. 35-36 (L. F. Il'ichev and A. Maslin to Malenkov, 28 March 1949; 
Bol'shakov to Malenkov, 25 April 1949). 
32 Nelli Morozova, “A sudʹi - kto?,” Iskusstvo kino 1 (1994): 141–42. 
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Hollywood films so poorly as to indicate “either gross incompetence or deliberate 
bungling”.33 Poor quality was acceptable for trophies, in stark contrast to expectations for 
Soviet-made features. Finally, the simplified censorship process meant that trophy films were 
also quicker to produce. In just under seven months, thirty-seven of the fifty trophy films 
earmarked for processing in August 1948 had been edited, copied and distributed, while 
eleven more were nearly ready for Soviet audiences.34 
To summarize, there were several pragmatic advantages to screening captured foreign 
films after the war. They entertained audiences during a dearth in domestic production, while 
drawing much-needed revenue from willing viewers—all at negligible cost to the Ministry of 
Cinema. Based on this analysis, one might well echo novelist Vasilii Aksenov in his claim that 
“[t]he authorities, looking for a way to bring in money, decided to swallow their ideological 
pride and release [trophy films] for public consumption.”35 However, this would be a hasty 
conclusion. Far from swallowing their ideological pride, Soviet authorities saw in trophy films 
the opportunity to bolster claims of superiority by demonstrating the universality of key tenets 
of the Soviet worldview, thereby combining entertainment (and profitability) with political 
education.   
The	Ideological	Potential	of	Trophy	Films	
In fact, the leadership had been interested in this issue of the hidden ideological potential of 
certain Hollywood films several months before they numbered among the spoils of war. In 
late 1944, the Soviet leadership abruptly suspended the lively wartime film exchange with 
Washington and instead pursued a deal directly with Hollywood film studio RKO Pictures. 
The intention was to acquire films that Washington had been unwilling to trade—films that 
                                                
33 J. D. Parks, Culture, Conflict and Coexistence: American-Soviet Cultural Relations, 1917-1958 (London: McFarland, 
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showed America in a negative light—and gain greater latitude in editing the films to suit 
Soviet educational aims.36 The ploy ultimately failed in early 1945, but the Reichsfilmarchiv 
trophies offered the opportunity to put the plan into action. The result was the release of 
scores of films processed in such a way as to foreground their instructive value to Soviet 
audiences. This was achieved through careful selection, editing and presentation oriented 
toward highlighting, intensifying, and at times manufacturing social and political critique in 
the Western films.  
Each of these processes warrants closer consideration, beginning with selection. It is 
unclear who initiated the first six trophy releases in early 1947,37 although Bol'shakov credited 
Stalin with choosing the two Hollywood productions, Escape from Chains (Pobeg s katorgi; I am a 
Fugitive from a Chain Gang, LeRoy, 1932) and Senator (Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, Capra, 
1939).38 Stalin remained involved intermittently in the selection process,39 and likely weighed 
the foreign films according to their ideological content prior to supporting their release. After 
all, despite his own love for Westerns, Stalin condemned their problematic ideology and 
ultimately only five were approved for release, making Westerns one of the least represented 
genres of trophy film.40 The majority of titles, however, were selected by Bol'shakov’s 
ideological brigades on the grounds of their either neutral or complementary ideology. 
Musicals in particular were deemed apolitical (neitral'nyi) and therefore harmless by Bol'shakov 
and later also Agitprop functionaries V. S. Kruzhkov and A. N. Sazonov—a position 
                                                
36 Parks, Culture, Conflict and Coexistence, 96–97. Although it was standard practice across Europe to edit 
Hollywood films, Washington was more wary of Soviet intentions and sought to limit editing rights. 
37 Mikhail Sulʹkin, “‘Trofeinoe’ kino?..Net, vorovannoe. Sovetskie kinotrofei v Amerike,” Iskusstvo kino 9 (2002): 
132. Turovskaia credits a screenwriter and Ministry of Cinema functionary named Makliarskii with the idea, but 
does not elaborate or cite sources. Turovskaia, “Gollivud v Moskve,” 59. 
38 RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 576, l. 60 (Bol'shakov to Kuznetsov, Suslov, and Voroshilov, 27 October 1947). 
39 For instance, Stalin instigated the distribution of Meet John Doe (Poznakom'tes' s Dzhonom Dou, Capra, 1941) in 
1951 and pronounced the final word on the proposed four-fold Tarzan film release in 1952. RGASPI f. 17, op. 
133 (Agitprop), d. 341, l. 40 (Dokladnaia zapiska o trofeinom amerikanskaia fil'me ‘Poznakom'tes c Dzhonom Dou’ to 
Malenkov, 15 August 1951), reprinted in Anderson and Maksimenkov, Kremlevskii kinoteatr, 881. Arkhiv 
Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AP RF) f. 3, op. 35, d. 74, ll. 90-94 (letter to A. N. Poskrebyshev from 
Bol'shakov, 31 January 1951), reprinted in Irina Kondakova, “Tarzan -- chelovek, ne isporchennyi burzhuaznoi 
tsivilizatsiei,” Istochnik 4 (1999): 100.  
40 Alan Ball, Imagining America: Influence and Images in Twentieth-Century Russia (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2003), 87; Knight, “Stalin’s Trophy Films.” 
	 13 
presumably accepted by the Secretary of the Central Committee who oversaw Agitprop, 
Andrei Zhdanov, and Malenkov to whom the claims were made.41 Such films were valued for 
their musicality (muzykal'nost') and dance performances,42 implying that the Soviet 
appreciation for the arts transcended national divides.  
The remaining films were selected for their potential to coincide with the Soviet 
portrayal of the West and its history. For example, the first three titles listed on the 31 August 
1948 resolution were anti-British films produced under the Nazis, to which three more were 
later added. A similarly small minority championed revolutionary causes, such as the 
“struggle of the Mexican people for democracy” in Captain of the Army ‘Freedom’,43 and the 
Hungarian revolution of 1848 in Maria Ilona (1948; Bolvary, 1939), a heroine praised by 
Bol'shakov for sacrificing romantic love in the name of her country.44 A range of historical 
biographical films on the various “classical and ‘progressive’ foreign cultural figures”45 for 
whom there was official approval—including Liszt, Schumann, and Paracelsus—also featured 
among the releases.  
Most numerous, however, were films about people on the fringes of capitalist 
society.46 Such films echoed what Timothy Johnston identifies as the three central themes of 
Soviet anti-Western propaganda: workers struggling under economic and racial exploitation; 
the spuriousness of “capitalist democracy”; and the “soulless, economically driven nature of 
capitalist society” that rendered “gangsterism” and cynicism rife in the West.47 These themes 
evoked a society divided by exploitation, which was an image that resonated with many 
Depression-era productions. As Kruzhkov and Sazonov later observed, among the captured 
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reels were “films essentially exposing American pseudo-democracy and the anti-popular 
policies of the imperialist circles of America”.48 More specifically, Bol'shakov and his team 
found that The Road of Affliction (Doroga bedstvii, 1948; The Grapes of Wrath, Ford, 1940) presented 
“two Americas: the flashy capitalist elite, who possess all the wealth of the country, and an 
enormous proportion of the population who are huddled in miserable hovels, without the 
means for a piece of bread”.49 Adaptations of Victor Hugo, Dickens, and Shakespeare were 
similarly deemed to reveal the oppressions of capitalism. Meanwhile, the Humphrey Bogart 
crime drama Slums of the Big City (Trushchoby bol'shogo goroda, 1948; Dead End, Wyler, 1937) was 
recommended for its depiction of the “desperate and hopeless [bezperspektivnoe] situation of the 
inhabitants of the city’s outskirts, [and…] American gangsterism”,50 while boxing film Eighth 
Round (Vos'moi raund, 1948; The Crowd Roars, Thorpe, 1938) similarly uncovered the “gangster-
like morals and dirty back room dealings of American sports.”51 Political comedy-dramas like 
Capra’s Senator, Dominated by the Dollar (Vo vlasti dollara, 1949; Mr. Deeds Goes to Town, 1936) and 
Meet John Doe (Poznakom'tes' s Dzhonom Dou, 1941) likewise illustrated the Soviet claim that 
Western democracy was corrupted by “big money” and cronyism—although a degree of 
creative editing was necessary in order to erase the redemptive message of these films, which 
ultimately saw the “little man” positively affect the political system. These films, if handled 
attentively, provided prime material with which to critique the unenlightened anti-humanism 
of capitalism and imply a contrast with Soviet culture by defining it in terms of what it was 
not: divided, corrupt, exploitative, soulless and cynical. 
 Combined with careful film selection was scrupulous editing in the areas of morality, 
political ideology, religion and happy endings. An outline of changes to be made 
accompanied the majority of Bol'shakov’s requests to the Politburo for approval to release 
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films,52 and provides rich material for the analysis of Soviet editing strategies. In terms of 
morality editing, films were purged of vulgarity and excessive violence. Content deemed 
vulgar (poshlyi) included photographs of a character’s mistresses, lewd movements in a ballet 
performance, a peeping Tom, cross-dressing, a cheeky song, and multiple scenes of revelry 
(kutezh), while a scheming, adulterous Russian character underwent nationality reassignment. 
Gor'kii studio editor Nelli Morozova, who implemented the changes to trophy films that were 
outlined by censors, recalls that measures to defend Soviet chasteness were even more 
thorough than Bol'shakov’s notes indicate, and required the removal of frames featuring “the 
legs of a dancer, a tutu whirling up, a lingering kiss, a beautiful woman in a see-through 
dress.”53 Instances of murder and torture were earmarked for excision as well, while violent 
sequences were shortened.  
Alterations to the political content of the films centered primarily on the removal of 
scenes that depicted monarchical and colonial authority in benevolent terms. To this end, 
Napoleon III, one of the Habsburgs, an Australian governor, and two English kings were 
stripped of their characterization as honorable rulers intent on justice for their people. 
Positive portrayals of America and Americans in an international context were also jettisoned 
from several films, along with philosophical sentiments not in keeping with socialist realism, 
such as a conversation on the incompatibility of art and reality in the German biopic of 
Robert Schumann. Among the most precise descriptions of edits to be made were those 
removing material of a religious or mystical nature. Prayer, religious rites, and special effects 
implying spiritual intervention were systematically excluded, while John Doe was stripped of 
his Christian values.54  
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The most intriguing variety of edit, however, dealt with the irrepressible happy ending 
for which Hollywood and UFA—the German film factory—were well-known. Protagonists 
were repeatedly left to languish in relational strife as reconciliations were circumvented and 
weddings cancelled by Soviet censors. Meanwhile, the British people were twice denied the 
climactic pledge of an incumbent king to right the wrongs of his predecessor. In a feat of 
editing that would have impressed montage experimentalist Lev Kuleshov, a courtroom full 
of oppressed Americans was made to protest the heroic Mr. Deeds’ imprisonment rather than 
celebrate his exoneration when the outcome of the trial was reversed by censors in Dominated 
by the Dollar. Rather than closing with a kiss, the Soviet version ended with a shot of the hero 
in prison, crafted by repeating a frame from earlier in the film in which Mr. Deeds sat at a 
window covered over with chain link fencing.55 These examples demonstrate that far from 
releasing trophies hastily, bent solely on profit, the Ministry of Cinema and Politburo paid 
close attention to the content of trophy films, enlisting skilled technicians like Morozova to 
recast the Hollywood dream into a capitalist nightmare.  
Trophy films that could not be edited satisfactorily were dropped from production, 
demonstrating the regime’s willingness to forego potential profit in the interest of releasing 
cinema deemed suitable for Soviet audiences. For example, the list compiled by Bol'shakov in 
August 1948 originally consisted of 70 films, 19 of which were charged with being “politically 
alien or artistically shoddy” by the Agitprop representatives who screened them.56 Among the 
blacklisted, were films deemed racist, such as Last of the Mohicans (Seitz, 1936) and two 
German productions; imperialist, like German biopic Carl Peters (Selpin, 1941); or erroneous 
in their representation of revolution or history, such as The Good Earth (Franklin, 1937) and 
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Cardinal Richelieu (Lee, 1935).57 Others were too Christian, militarist, or capitalist, including: 
The Crusades (DeMille, 1935), criticized for its characterization of Richard the Lionheart as a 
man of faith; Test Pilot (Fleming, 1938), which championed American military strength in the 
air; and Captain January (Butler, 1936), a film so pervaded by the kindness of a capitalist that it 
could not be corrected, presumably even by removing the happy ending.58 The moral quality 
of the films was also under close inspection, with loose morals, pornographic images, or 
vulgarity accounting for the majority of the German films struck from processing. Further 
criticism for poor production values and acting sealed the fate of over half of these discarded 
trophies, revealing that Agitprop vetted the films according to both ideological appropriateness 
and entertainment value. However, only three films were dismissed solely on artistic grounds, 
with the concern that they would not appeal to Soviet audiences, demonstrating that political, 
religious and moral shortcomings were more salient a cause for withholding a film from 
Soviet release. These 16 ideologically-based exclusions represented a loss of 630-710 million 
rubles in potential profit, if Ministry of Cinema estimates of revenue per film are 
considered.59 Meanwhile, actual losses were incurred when three more films initially 
approved in August 1948 were later abandoned at Bol'shakov’s request because the planned 
edits failed to produce a suitable Soviet version.60 Tellingly, these financial losses are not even 
mentioned in the archival record.  
 The refashioning of Western cinema to coincide with the Soviet perspective on 
capitalist society did not end with the processing of the films, but also pertained to their 
presentation. The majority of the films were presented as evidence of the military superiority 
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of the Soviet Union, as the opening credits were removed and replaced with a notice 
explaining the victorious provenance of the film: “This film was captured as a military trophy 
during the Great Patriotic War.”61 Efforts were also made to “orient the viewer properly” 
regarding the interpretation of the films, through “carefully edited” explanatory texts 
prefacing and defining each film in ideological terms.62 For instance, the John Wayne vehicle 
The Journey will be Dangerous (Puteshestvie budet opasnym, 1948; Stagecoach, Ford, 1939) opened with 
the warning that,   
[t]his film speaks about the customs of American bourgeois society, and the 
hypocrisy and bigotry that are its hallmark. It is not difficult for the Soviet 
viewer to see that the film depicts the American colonial policy towards Indian 
tribes inaccurately.63 
What was effectively a revenge thriller was transformed into an argument against colonialism, 
as the focus was shifted from John Wayne as an individual seeking justice for his father’s 
murder to settlement policies in the American West. The notices prior to the Tarzan films 
were less prescriptive, consisting mainly of a straightforward plot summary (somewhat of a 
spoiler in the case of the first film). However, each opening text also included the assertion 
that, “Tarzan, as a man unspoiled by bourgeois civilization, opposes himself to the cruel and 
greedy American and British business dealers”.64 This description invested the Ape Man with 
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the characteristics of a socialist realist positive hero in the “spontaneous” stage of political 
development.  
The new titles given to many of the films likewise tended to indicate how they were to 
be understood. As Richard Stites points out, Fate of a Soldier in America (Sud'ba soldata v Amerike), 
the new title of the prohibition gangster film The Roaring Twenties (1952; Walsh, 1939), 
“underlin[ed] capitalist heartlessness toward veterans”65 by transmuting the exceptional 
challenges faced by Bogart into the typical experience of Great War veterans. Other titles 
such as Dominated by the Dollar, Requital (Rasplata [which can also be translated “payment”], 
1948; The Count of Monte Cristo, Lee, 1934) and Stronger Dollar (Sil'nee dollar, suggested by 
Bol'shakov [read: Stalin] for Meet John Doe but ultimately abandoned66) transformed a minor 
plot point into the primary theme of the film, and fabricated a preoccupation with wealth 
that was arguably absent from the original pictures.67 
 While introductory texts and titles framed the individual film, the press framed the 
phenomenon of Western cinema as a whole by providing the Soviet audience with unceasing 
reminders as to the inferiority of bourgeois cinema in comparison to socialist realist film 
production. This tendency was particularly marked in Iskusstvo kino, the sole cinema periodical 
at the time, which in one issue alone featured derogatory analyses of Western (and 
particularly American) film by Vsevolod Pudovkin, Sergei Gerasimov, and screenwriter Boris 
Chirskov.68 Even Bol'shakov contributed to the discussion when he announced the complete 
ideological and artistic domination of Soviet cinematography over that of the West at 
international film festivals in France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.69 This constant barrage of 
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criticism as to the poor artistic quality and ideological illegitimacy of Western cinema 
reinforces the notion that trophy films were not intended simply for entertainment, but rather 
provided a window onto a corrupt system through both their content and their supposedly 
poor production values.  
 This theme was also developed by the first of only two press articles to acknowledge 
the existence of trophy films, a piece in Kul'tura i zhizn' dedicated to Girl of my Dreams in March 
1947 before it was screened on wide release. The article consisted primarily of viewer 
responses to the film (discussed further below), but opened with this telling statement: “This 
film, considered the best work of German cinematography, is a clear example of the complete 
spiritual emptiness and moral decline of bourgeois cinema art.”70 The second article, penned 
by Komsomol head Nikolai Mikhailov and printed in Komsomol'skaia pravda in October 1947, 
criticized Bol'shakov and his Ministry for the supposed dominance of foreign (trophy) films on 
Soviet screens, calling instead for increased Soviet film production.71 Bol'shakov responded 
forcefully to this criticism, involving Kliment Voroshilov (then head of the bureau for culture 
under the Council of Ministers) in reprimanding Mikhailov and his publication in order to 
prevent them from further “disorienting” (dezorientirovat') the Soviet public.72 Subsequently, 
the press refrained from mentioning trophy films. Critiques of bourgeois cinema studiously 
avoided naming films released from the trophy collection, even while discussing others that 
no doubt formed part of the collection. Chirskov, for example, concentrated his ire upon 
Citizen Kane (Welles, 1941), Goodbye, Mr. Chips (Wood, 1939) and Cavalcade (Lloyd, 1933), all of 
which were likely part of the Reichsfilmarchiv given their significance and years of production, 
though none were screened publicly.  
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 The silence of the press on trophy films was not solely the result of Bol'shakov’s 
intimidation tactics. Instead, there were several reasons why the press was not mobilized to 
elaborate explicitly on the place of trophy films within the regime’s anti-Western campaign, 
not least being the illegal nature of the American film screenings. Press coverage would only 
draw the attention of American observers—who scrutinized the Soviet press closely73—to the 
unlicensed screening of Hollywood films, and risk prompting a retaliatory boycott of Artkino, 
the company that distributed Soviet cinema in America.74 Film promotion in general was also 
at a low point during malokartin'e, and even many Soviet releases failed to generate significant 
coverage. An October 1947 resolution barring the publication of information about films not 
yet released limited press coverage of cinema and implicitly encouraged film critics to let 
Pravda establish the tone of the discussion. Arguably, Pravda remained silent on trophy films 
because of an appreciation for the fineness of the line that the regime trod between the 
ideological hazard and potential inherent in airing enemy films. As Pamela Kachurin and 
Musya Glants observe with regard to the Cold War, “[t]he potential for conflicting or 
ambiguous interpretations made it difficult to use cultural products efficaciously as forms of 
propaganda.”75 For although bourgeois films were (supposedly) ideologically and artistically 
inferior, emphasizing these flaws too strenuously risked prompting audiences to question why 
they were being screened at all if they were so morally and spiritually vacuous. This is why a 
public critique of trophy films like Mikhailov’s was reprimanded decisively: his article truly 
did “disorient” the viewing public.  
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Ultimately, the release of these films was a gamble deemed worthwhile. As the anti-
cosmopolitanism campaign intensified and the Soviet economy recovered, trophy film 
releases persisted, even outlasting Stalin.76 Whether or not the risk bore dividends for the 
regime with the viewing public, however, is another issue altogether, and one to which we 
now turn.  
Responses	to	Trophy	Films	
The issue of reception is complicated by the scarcity of sources and their disparity in type and 
origin. Recorded responses to trophy film come from a range of Soviet, former-Soviet, and 
post-socialist sources: from politically correct Party activists and letter writers addressing their 
concerns to newspaper editors and officials at the time; to contemporaneous Soviet émigrés 
interviewed by the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System and former Soviets 
interviewed by Western scholars since the collapse of that system; to leading cultural figures 
and memoirists writing from abroad—like Aksenov and poet and essayist Iosif Brodskii—or 
during the final days of perestroika, like poet Bulat Okudzhava. The picture that emerges from 
this patchwork of sources is predictably varied. Trophy films were both rejected and revered, 
considered lightly and scrutinized closely, taken as pure entertainment and as truth about the 
outside world. Such diversity of responses is in fact typical of late Stalin era film reception,77 
and is testament to the complexity of the experiment to integrate entertainment and ideology. 
As will emerge in the following analysis of negative and positive viewer responses, part of the 
danger of merging political education and entertainment was the potential for audiences to 
overlook the lesson. Yet it was in this very risk that the benefit also lay: namely, the possibility 
of shaping the perceptions and prejudices of the public without their awareness.  
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Despite their popularity at the box office, trophy films were not greeted with 
unanimous favor. The press coverage discussed earlier referred to letters of complaint 
received by the editors of Komsomol'skaia pravda and Kul'tura i zhizn', with the latter printing 
excerpts that deplored Girl of my Dreams as a “typical bourgeois, vulgar film” with “alien 
music-hall morals and music-hall heroes”. It was “not only unprincipled, but also harmful. 
[For…] after a deadly war against the fascist barbarians, after the horrific devastation and the 
enormous sacrifices of the Soviet people, they show starry-eyed [prekrasnodushnykh] Germans.” 
Others echoed this complaint, stating that “this is not the girl of our dreams! We do not need 
such a thing!” and holding instead that such were the “dreams of fascist youths”.78 It is no 
surprise that a third of the complainants are identified by their military rank. Another third 
are identified as students, at least one of whom was involved in the petition signed by 150 
Physics students at the Leningrad State University demanding the removal of the film from 
the screen.79 Young people were likewise implicated in the denunciation of trophy films later 
that year at meetings organized by the Komsomol. Held in the wake of the honor court trial of 
cancer researchers Nina Kliueva and Grigorii Roskin, the meetings censured young people 
for various behaviors perceived as pro-Western, which included demonstrating a fondness for 
Girl of my Dreams.80  
There is only limited archival evidence of continued popular opposition to trophy 
films, consisting of a brief report and an anonymous letter. The report from deputy head of 
Agitprop L.F. Il'ichev,81 warned of a large quantity of complaint letters received in 1948 by the 
editors of central newspapers from workers concerned with the ideological content of trophy 
films—or more precisely, based on Il'ichev’s examples, German and Czech films. The Czech 
film Rescued Banners (Spasennye znamena, 1948; Port Arthur, Farkas, 1936), set during the Russo-
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Japanese War, came under particularly heated attack as the antithesis of recent Soviet 
achievements in art and for its poisonous, hostile ideology. One Leningrader even decried it 
as a sign of the depths to which “patriotic cinematography” had fallen in allowing foreign 
films access to the crucial “Russian weapon” of the silver screen.82 In 1950, another such 
letter crossed Malenkov’s desk, this time sounding the alarm against the covert ideological 
messages of Hollywood. The author pointed out, for example, that Van Dyke’s Rose-Marie 
(1949; 1936) demonstrated the honorable character of the American police (although the film 
is about a Canadian Mountie), and dealt a “blow to the defense of the Soviet state, 
undermining its psychological and ideological power in a possible future war.”83 Similarly, 
Deanna Durbin films such as The Actress’ Secret (Sekret aktrisy, 1948; Mad about Music, Taurog, 
1938) and First Ball (Pervyi bal, 1948; First Love, Koster, 1939) maintained that “the poor but 
honest person always finds happiness in America—without revolutionary protest—
demonstrating the life of fun led by the American youth, etc.”84 The author was clearly well-
versed in current affairs and cultural campaigns, even referring to the Cold War as an artistic 
struggle. Nevertheless, when forwarding the letter to Malenkov, Agitprop officials dismissed the 
author’s concerns decisively, and Malenkov ordered the matter closed.85 Although it is 
impossible to discern the extent of popular opposition to trophy films from these sources, it is 
plain that the Soviet leadership did not consider it sufficient grounds to remove the films from 
circulation. 
There is much more to be drawn from the viewer responses recorded in memoirs and 
interviews, which were markedly positive. It is from these sources that scholarship has gained 
a sense of the general popularity of the films—from accounts such as that of Okudzhava, who 
describes how 
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[n]ormal life stopped in the city. Everyone talked about the film [Girl of my 
Dreams], they ran to see it whenever they had a chance, in the streets people 
whistled melodies from it, from half-open windows you could hear people 
playing tunes from it on the piano.86 
The recollections of former stiliagi (stylish ones) of the youth sub-culture that blossomed 
during the late 1940s and 1950s are particularly fruitful on the subject of trophy films. 
Research and interviews conducted by scholars of the youth movement have 
highlighted the importance of the trophies as conduits for the jazz music and Western 
dances, fashion and hairstyles that so captivated the stiliagi.87 Aksenov, a former stiliaga 
himself, describes how the subtitled Hollywood films even furnished them with a 
vocabulary, as he and his friends spoke to one another “almost entirely in quotes from 
American movies”.88 Meanwhile, self-declared “stylish man Number One” Tikhonenko 
recalls modeling his wardrobe on trophy film heroes, even purchasing a Stetson hat in 
order to better advertise his wares as a black marketer.89 The Tarzan films in particular 
generated a cult following as boys and young men adopted the longer coif sported by 
Johnny Weissmuller—although young women opted to model their hairstyles after 
Marika Rökk and Deanna Durbin rather than Tarzan’s Maureen O’Sullivan.90 Tarzan 
provided no end of entertainment outside the cinema as well, as children played 
“Tarzan and Cheetah” in the courtyards and frightened cows on the kolkhozy with their 
                                                
86 Quoted in Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 214. For the original, see: Bulat Okudzhava, “Devushka moei 
mechty,” 1991, 3, http://userdocs.ru/voennoe/50647/index.html. 
87 Edele, “Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow,” 56; Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 125; Fürst, Stalin’s Last 
Generation, 209, 237; Gleb Tsipursky, “Young Jazz Enthusiasts and the Cultural Cold War in the Soviet Union, 
1948-53” (Music and Power Symposium, Miami University, 2013), 8, 
http://www.units.muohio.edu/havighurstcenter/events/Music_PowerSymposium.html. 
88 Aksyonov, In Search of Melancholy Baby, 18. 
89 Guk, “Tarzan v svoem otechestve: Valentin Tikhonenko.” 
90 Eduard Shim, “Ready, Heave!,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press 19, no. 15 (1967): 12; Fürst, Stalin’s Last 
Generation, 207; Brodskii, “Trofeinoe (1986),” 419. 
	 26 
Ape Man yells (allegedly reducing milk production), while older youths drew upon the 
dialogues between the jungle king and his lady love for strategies in courting.91 
In a memoir of his years in Moscow, New York Times correspondent Harrison Salisbury 
interprets the popularity of Tarzan and other trophies as evidence of the need for escapism in 
postwar Soviet society—a correlation that social historian Juliane Fürst also highlights.92 
Using testimonials from young viewers preserved in the Komsomol archives, Fürst points out 
that they “valued foreign films because of their ‘ability to address a light subject that 
entertains the viewer, gives him rest and instills in him the feeling of something beautiful’.”93 
Johnston notes a similar theme in his interviews as, for instance, “Natalia Leonidovna 
reminisced about foreign movies that, ‘…everyone wanted to look at something beautiful and 
bright, it was pleasant’. Svetlana Ivanovna also remembered that ‘…the foreign films had 
beautiful costumes and people in them. They were very good.’”94 In other words, the 
ideological message of Sovietized foreign films did not necessarily factor into the viewing 
experience. Indeed, Stites found that when questioned in 1990, Leningrad audiences 
“recalled the fact but not the messages of the propaganda lessons that preceded” the films.95 
Similarly, of the nearly hundred Harvard interview project respondents who mentioned 
foreign films (in overwhelmingly positive terms), only a handful demonstrated any awareness 
that the films had been deliberately selected, censored, or otherwise processed by officials.96 
Instead, trophy films were above all, entertaining.  
These glimpses into popular reception provide compelling evidence for the seeming 
failure of attempts to exploit entertaining trophy films to convey Soviet ideology. According 
to these sources, trophies were at best escapist and at worst, anti-Soviet, while the warning 
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against the ills of capitalism was apparently unmemorable. Yet the failure of viewers to 
identify the ideological wrapping in which trophy films were repackaged is not necessarily a 
sign of the failure of that message. After all, the best learned ideological lessons are those the 
audience does not realize it has absorbed, which is arguably a key motivation for the synthesis 
of entertainment and enlightenment in Soviet cultural production. The critiques of capitalism 
made by trophy films were very familiar to Soviet viewers and may not have warranted 
particular note, while nevertheless reinforcing a Soviet worldview. At the very least, a handful 
of Harvard interviewees did recognize that the foreign films screened in the USSR during the 
1940s (both trophies and legal imports) were “advantageous to the Soviet power [sic]”.97  
If the aim was to fan the flames of anti-capitalist sentiment, the Sovietization of these 
foreign films fell short of the mark. However, if the goal was to sharpen the definition of what 
the USSR was and was not in the context of cultural conflict, there remains a thread of 
evidence to support the efficacy of trophy films. This thread, weaving through the full range 
of viewer responses, is the perception that the films’ release was a mistake on the part of the 
regime. That this was a feature of negative responses is of course no surprise. For instance, 
Mikhailov opens his condemnatory editorial in Komsomol'skaia pravda with a reminder of the 
“serious mistakes” committed by the Ministry of Cinema the preceding year (a reference to 
the Central Committee resolution of 4 September 1946 shelving films by Lukov, Pudovkin, 
Eisenstein, and Kozintsev and Trauberg), implying that it had done so again with the release 
of trophy films.98 The anonymous complainant of 1950 makes a similar point, questioning the 
“naïve cinema dealers […] who do not understand that these films are intended by their 
creators to contaminate the consciousness of the people.”99 According to viewers critical of 
trophies, the regime conceded too much ground to the enemy in screening these films.  
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Positive responses likewise considered the state to have been in error, albeit for a 
slightly different reason: they held that trophy films fuelled deviant, if not outright 
oppositionist behavior among viewers. For instance, Aksenov writes that a friend, after 
becoming a high-ranking officer in the Soviet Air Force, confided to him that “Comrade 
Stalin made a big mistake by letting our generation see those films.” Aksenov continues, 
explaining that “they provided one of the few windows to the outside world from our stinking 
Stalinist lair”,100 implying that it was by the light of this window that the stinking lair was 
revealed as such. The example of Karan Kondikian betrays the perceived danger of staring 
out of this window too avidly. He recounted to Hollywood producer Tom Luddy that his 
childhood obsession with Tarzan and persistent questioning at school regarding travel to 
Africa resulted in his father’s internment in the gulag.101 Kondikian construed his love for 
Tarzan as threatening to the regime. Brodskii agrees, crediting the Tarzan films with having 
“aided de-Stalinization more than all of Khrushchev’s speeches to the XXth Party Congress 
and subsequently.”102 In this manner, even accounts that laud trophy films consider the line 
between acceptability and transgression too fine to regard them as unproblematic. These 
reactions implicitly indicate the regime’s success in defining Sovietness—what it was and was 
not—since both viewers who were critical of trophy films and those who greeted them 
enthusiastically perceived watching trophy films as transgressive. Of course, this small success 
was overshadowed, however, by the larger failure of Soviet-made films to keep foreign 
cinema in its place, instead conceding box office triumph to trophy films. 
Conclusion		
Trophy film played a pivotal role in sustaining the postwar film industry. The Sovietized 
foreign films bolstered production rates, fulfilled profit plans, and infused the screen with 
                                                
100 Aksyonov, In Search of Melancholy Baby, 18. 
101 Tom Luddy, “My Dinner with Luddy,” Mother Jones Magazine, December 1984, 33. 
102 Brodskii, “Trofeinoe (1986),” 419. 
	 29 
added generic diversity, maintaining the presence of popular genres that were constricted by 
censorship after the war. Alongside these tangible results is also the more fraught ideological 
significance of these films. Scholarship has already noted the influence of trophy films on the 
youth culture of stiliagi, whom Aksenov credits as the first dissidents.103 But what has been 
explored here is the ideological use to which the regime sought to put these films, and the 
ways in which they were processed in order that they might contribute to defining Soviet 
identity. That they did so from a somewhat incongruous, even paradoxical angle—enemy 
cinema—points to a fundamental characteristic of ideology, namely that it requires dialogue 
with its opponent. This was not simply an aberration of the cinema industry. As Vladimir 
Pechatnov explains in his study of Soviet and foreign propaganda during the early Cold War, 
“in their pursuit of ideological indoctrination the [regime] relied not on the isolation of the 
Soviet people from Western propaganda, but to some extent on the ‘struggle of ideas’.”104 
This is why magazines such as Amerika and British Ally (Britanskii Soiuznik) were permitted to 
circulate. It is also why, as Johnston observes in his analysis of Cold War Official Soviet 
Identity, “the most important factor within Soviet identity […] was the capitalist West, and in 
particular America” and its cultural production, including film.105 American culture provided 
Sovietness with both a counterpart and antithesis: a standard against which to measure 
success, and an example against which the uniqueness of the Soviet model was defined. 
Despite the anti-Western resolutions and rhetoric that proliferated beginning in 1947, Soviet 
culture could not persist apart from its opponent; for Sovietness to have meaning, there had 
to be continued interaction with Western culture. Trophy films provided a form of such 
interaction, albeit one that the regime sought to choreograph closely. In this sense, the 
cinema industry sought to fashion captured films into trophies not just of the Great Patriotic 
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War, but of the Cold War as well, marking Soviet victory on both fronts of the cultural 
conflict. These films were intended to represent the victory of postwar Soviet culture over 
Western culture. The problem for the regime was that despite its best efforts, Soviet viewers 
did not always perceive trophy cinema in this way. 
 
 
